Posted by Abrams Hap
May 22, 2013
This article will show Pearl Harbor as never before known by the majority of Americans. With sorrow, it will show the attack on Pearl Harbor was an engineered instigation by the U.S. as a strategy of provocation forcing the prideful Japanese to attack. A blind eye and deaf ear would be turned and an attack would be allowed against America herself, creating overwhelming support from the American people to enter World War Two.
The art of stratagem often requires sacrifice to gain victory.
The year was 1941. The wars in Europe and Asia were raging. America kept herself out of war, while watching her allies in a desperate battle for their very existence. The United States, still immersed in the great depression, was under great pressure from its allies to enter the war. Many nation’s futures depended on American action. The majority of Americans were reluctant to repeat the horrors of World War One, and an isolationist mentality prevailed. Franklin D. Roosevelt knew America would inevitably face the Axis threat and preferred it be under conditions more advantageous to the United States.
Prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor the American military was small and outdated. Much of the U.S. armed forces structure, tactics, weaponry, and equipment were World War One era. Elements of the American Calvary still rode on horseback. Due to the great depression, funding of the armed forces was minimal. Actions were taking to upgrade and strengthen the military. However, peacetime modernization would be a slow process.
Unsuccessful provoking of Germany in the North Atlantic, led to more than antagonistic tactics toward the Japanese. Japan was a “hara-kiri nation” and would rather commit national suicide for honor than allow herself to be humiliated by the United States. A preemptive attack by Japan against the U.S. would be the catalyst needed to motivate the American people, and jump start the American economy and industries, for war.
On October 7, 1940, Lieutenant Commander Arthur McCollum of the Office of Naval Intelligence submitted a memo to Navy Captains Walter Anderson and Dudley Knox (whose endorsement is included in the following scans). Captains Anderson and Knox were two of President Roosevelt’s most trusted military advisers.
The memo, scanned below, detailed an 8 step plan to provoke Japan into attacking the United States. President Roosevelt, over the course of 1941, implemented all 8 of the recommendations contained in the McCollum memo. Following the eighth provocation, Japan attacked Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941.
Prior to the attack the US congress failed to allocate funds for upgrading the navy and air force. America’s World War One ships were moored, as far away from mainland America, and as near to the Japanese as possible, at Pearl Harbor. The four newer U.S. aircraft carrier groups were safely away from Pearl harbor during the attack.
The packed ships in Pearl Harbor’s shallow waters were too much of an invitation for the angered and humiliated Japanese not to attack. Isoroku Yamamoto, a Japanese Marshal Admiral and the commander-in-chief of the Combined Fleet during World War Two, warned the attack unwise. However, he was overruled. Yamamoto had studied in the US and knew her potential as an industrial powerhouse. Yamamoto is quoted after the attack on Pearl harbor as saying, “I fear all we have done is to awaken a sleeping giant and fill him with a terrible resolve.”
Japan’s early morning attack on Pearl Harbor lasted less than two hours, but took an incredible toll: All eight U.S. Navy battleships were damaged, with four being sunk. Two of these were later raised, and with the remaining four repaired, six battleships returned to service later in the war. The Japanese also sank or damaged three cruisers, three destroyers, an anti-aircraft training ship, and one minelayer. 188 U.S. aircraft were destroyed; 2,402 Americans were killed, and 1,282 wounded. For its part, Japan lost 64 men and 29 planes.
The American public was told that the attack was a complete surprise. They were deceived into believing that a series of systematic “intelligence failures” had left the U.S. vulnerable to the Japanese attack. All this at a time when the state of affairs in the world was war. The American people believed the Manipulation-Craft without question, and America entered World War Two.
On December 8, President Roosevelt asked Congress to declare war against Japan. The declaration passed with just one dissenting vote. Three days later, Germany and Italy, allied with Japan, declared war on the United States.
Though stunned by the events of December 7, Americans were also resolute. An estimated 75,000 men volunteered for military service on December 8, 1941, and over one million by the end of the year. Within two years America had one of the largest, strongest, most modern armed forces in the world.
American airmen eventually dropped two atomic bombs on Japan, getting the sacrificial checkmate. The Little Boy bomb was dropped on the city of Hiroshima on August 6, 1945, and Fat Man was released over Nagasaki on August 9, 1945. The Empire of Japan surrendered on September 2, 1945.
Germany surrendered to Allied forces on May 7, 1945 four months prior. Italy surrendered September 8, 1943 two years prior.
8 step plan to provoke Japan.
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|Note the highlighted portion
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Page four of the memo states:
A. Make an arrangement with Britain for the use of British bases in the Pacific, particularly Singapore.
B. Make an arrangement with Holland for the use of base facilities and acquisition of supplies in the Dutch East Indies [now Indonesia].
c. Give all possible aid to the Chinese government of Chiang Kai-shek.
D. Send a division of long-range heavy cruisers to the Orient, Philippines, or Singapore.
E. Send two divisions of submarines to the Orient.
F. Keep the main strength of the US Fleet, now in the Pacific, in the vicinity of the Hawaiian Islands.
G. Insist that the Dutch refuse to grant Japanese demands for undue economic concessions, particularly oil.
H. Completely embargo all trade with Japan, in collaboration with a similar embargo imposed by the British Empire
Continued American provocation.
The Japanese kept diplomatic lines open with the United States on the off-chance they could negotiate and end to the embargo. Any hope of that vanished on November 26, 1941, when U.S. Secretary of State Cordell Hull handed Japanese ambassadors in Washington D.C. what has come to be known as the “Hull Note.”
The note said that the only way for the U.S. to remove the resource embargo was for Japan to: withdraw all military, naval, air and police forces from China and from Indochina. In addition the terms listed in the agreement, though not stated directly, would have ended the alliance Japan had signed with Germany and Italy the previous year.
A Japanese Times article regarding the Hull Note, entitled Countdown to catastrophe states, “Whether that note was an ultimatum that made it virtually certain Japan would wage war — or whether it represented the latest U.S. effort in ongoing negotiations to avert war — is a subject of hot debate to this day.”
Foreknowledge of a possible Japanese attack.
The following warning was issued on November 27, 1941, 10 days prior to the Pearl Harbor attack. This memo clearly shows that an attack was suspected, but the nature of the attack was unknown and in fact the primary suspicion was that an attack would occur west of Hawaii.
The warnings continued
U.S. News, FOX News, UK’s The Telegraph, and many other news publications have reported on a 20-page memo from FDR’s declassified FBI file, the Office of Naval Intelligence dated December 4, 1941 that warned of Japanese targets. This warning was given three days before the attack on Pearl Harbor and stated, “The focal point of the Japanese Espionage effort is the determination of the total strength of the United States. In anticipation of possible open conflict with this country, Japan is vigorously utilizing every available agency to secure military, naval and commercial information, paying particular attention to the West Coast, the Panama Canal and the Territory of Hawaii” The quote can be found on the first page, fifth paragraph down, under Introduction.
This memo was also published in the book entitled December 1941: 31 Days that Changed America and Saved the World which stated the Japanese were collecting “detailed technical information” that would be specifically used by its navy. To collect and analyze information, they were building a network of spies through their U.S. embassies and consulates.
- January 7, 1941, Dr. Ricardo Shreiber, the Peruvian envoy in Tokyo told Max Bishop, third secretary of the US embassy that he had just learned from his intelligence sources that there was a war plan involving a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor.
- March 31, 1941 – A Navy report by Bellinger and Martin predicted that if Japan made war on the US, they would strike Pearl Harbor without warning at dawn with aircraft from a maximum of 6 carriers. For years Navy planners had assumed that Japan, on the outbreak of war, would strike the American fleet wherever it was – it was the greatest danger from Japan. The fleet was the only threat to Japan’s plans. The fleet at Pearl Harbor was the only High Value Target. Logically, Japan couldn’t engage in any major operation with the American fleet on its flank. Initial seriously crippling attacks on the US fleet in Hawaii would be the only chance the Japanese military would have for eventual victory. The strategic options for the Japanese were not unlimited.
- July 10, 1941 – US Military Attache Smith-Hutton at Tokyo reported Japanese Navy secretly practicing aircraft torpedo attacks against capital ships in Ariake Bay. The bay closely resembles Pearl Harbor.
- July 1941 – The US Military Attache in Mexico forwarded a report that the Japanese were constructing special small submarines for attacking the American fleet in Pearl Harbor, and that a training program then under way included towing them from Japan to positions off the Hawaiian Islands, where they practiced surfacing and submerging.
The SCR-270 radar at Pearl Harbor
SCR-270 radar was at Opana Point, Hawaii on the morning of the seventh of December 1941 manned by two privates, Elliot and Joseph Lockard. That morning the set was supposed to be shut down, but the soldiers decided to get additional training time in since the truck scheduled to take them to breakfast was late. At 7:02 they detected the Japanese aircraft approaching Oahu at a distance of 130 miles (210 km) and Lockard telephoned the information center at Fort Shafter and reported “Large number of planes coming in from the north, three points east”. The operator taking his report passed on the information repeating that the operator emphasized he had never seen anything like it, and it was “an awful big flight.”
The report was passed on to an allegedly inexperienced and incompletely trained officer who had arrived only a week earlier. He thought they had detected a flight of B-17s arriving that morning from the US. There were only six B-17s in the group, so this did not account for the large size of the plot. The officer is said to have had little grasp of the technology, the radar operators were unaware of the B-17 flight (nor its size), and the B-17′s had no IFF (Identification friend or foe) system, nor any alternative procedure for identifying distant friendlies. The raid on Pearl Harbor started 55 minutes later.
From the Navy Department Library - Naval Messages Intercepted between 6 September and 4 December 1941
Purple Code - the top Japanese diplomatic machine cipher which used automatic telephone switches to separately and differently encipher each character sent. It was cracked by the Army Signal Intelligence Service (331 men).
J-19 - was the main Japanese diplomatic code book. This columnar code was cracked.
Coral Machine Cipher or JNA-20 - was a simplified version of Purple used by Naval attaches. Only one message deciphered prior to Pearl Harbor has been declassified.
Administrative Code - was an old four character transposition code used for personnel matters. No important messages were sent in this weak code. Introduced Nov 1938, it was seldom used after Dec 1940.
Magic - the security designation given to all decoded Japanese diplomatic messages. It’s hard not to conclude with historians like Charles Bateson that “Magic standing alone points so irresistibly to the Pearl Harbor attack that it is inconceivable anybody could have failed to forecast the Japanese move.” The NSA reached the same conclusion in 1955. Ultra – the security designation for decoded military messages.
In 1979 the NSA released 2,413 JN-25 orders of the 26,581 intercepted by US between Sept 1 and Dec 4, 1941. The NSA says “We know now that they contained important details concerning the existence, organization, objective, and even the whereabouts of the Pearl Harbor Strike Force.”
The US Government still refuses to identify or declassify any Dec 7, 1941 decrypts of JN-25 on the basis of national security, over a half-century after the war.